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Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Charta of
free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamen-
tal personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no mat-
ter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination,
devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.'
Abstract
This article argues that only increased cross-border cooperation through bilateral agreements
between domestic competition authorities in the developed world can regulate anti-competitive car-
tel activities effectively. To discuss this argument, the competition policies and laws of three emerg-
ing economies, namely South Africa, India, and Brazil are compared with the competition law of
the European Union. The benefits of bilateral agreements concerning international cartels appear
to be clear: only a synchronized and international approach will help developing nations in protect-
ing their markets from unfair competition practices. This article will discuss the state of anti-cartel
policies and legislation in the selected jurisdictions, the present state of coordination of competition
policies through promotion and cooperation at the hi-national and international level, and high-
light some examples of more publicized anti-competition cases. The article also provides an insight
into cartel activities in these three emerging economies and poses the question about which of the
existing methods ofcooperation is the most effective one for addressing cartel activities. It provides a
short overview of the existing international institutions and enforcement bodies that promote and
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coordinate international competition policies and anti-cartel initiatives. The cooperation methods
identified and utilized by the International Competition Network will be briefly analyzed in order
to support the authors' view on the relevance and importance of bilateral cooperation agreements
for the conclusion of successful cartel investigations. The article concludes with the observation that
more could be done by the developing "Newly Industrialized Nations" (NIC) to increase the collabo-
rative ties of their anti-competition policies and organizations as well as ensure that they fall under
the wider umbrella of regional competition regimes such as in the case of South Afica and the
European Union. Time will tell whether the emerging economies will be able to balance competi-
tion policy and consumer welfare in an effective and progressive way without affecting their trade
and investment policies.
I. Introduction
This 1972 dictum of the U.S. Supreme Court, read in conjunction with sections 1 and 2
of the U.S. Sherman Act,2 stresses the importance3 of balancing the demands of a free
market economy with the necessity to promote consumer welfare by limiting anti-com-
petitive corporate market distortion. In the developing world, many states, including
South Africa, have made some measurable progress in enacting competition legislation, or
antitrust laws as they are known in the United States. South Africa is a developing coun-
try with a very recently established competition regime. The majority of the population is
plagued by poverty and lack of services. 4 Consequently, anti-competitive business activi-
ties by corporations severely affect the poor of society: it is the poor who bear the heaviest
burden of anti-competitive behavior such as price fixing, price discrimination, and market
distortion leading to a market without sufficient competition. Cartel activity prevents
consumers and other market stakeholders from enjoying the benefits of a free and fair
market. Thus, the existence of cartels in an economy such as South Africa can have an
overall negative impact on the formation of a competitive and prosperous market econ-
omy. South Africa depends on direct foreign investment and thus has an interest in dem-
onstrating to a prospective investor that it takes a proactive stand on fair competition and
the "preservation of economic freedom."s In general, cartels, the "supreme evil of anti-
trust," 6 whose activities constitute one of the "most egregious offence(s) under competi-
tion law,"7 particularly those involving Multinational Corporations (MNCs), often have a
2. Section I of the Sherman Act states "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). Section 2 extends this prohibition on monopolies. See § 2.
3. The mission statement of the European Commission stresses the need to align these two interests. See,
e.g., Mission of Directorate General for Competition, EUROPEAN COMAUSSION, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competi-
tion/mission/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). Part One, Article 2 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community stresses the need for such a balance based on balanced economic
growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social
progress, and "a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment."
4. See South Africa Country Profile, U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/coun-
tries/profiles/ZAF.hunl (last visited Jan. 15, 2012), which ranks South Africa's Human Development Index at
123, compared with the U.K.'s rank of twenty-eight.
5. TopcoAssocs. Inc., 405 U.S. at 610.
6. Verizon Commc'n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004), cited in
KIRSTY MIDDLETON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON UK AND EC COMPETFMON LAw 325, n.1 (2009).
7. Mondi Ltd. and Kohler Cores and Tubes [2002] ZACT (LM) at 27 1 87 (S. Afr.).
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particularly negative impact on developing market economies: market dominance, its dis-
tortion, and an absence of consumer welfare are just some possible consequences.
This article argues that increased cross-border cooperation through bilateral agree-
ments between domestic competition authorities in the developed world can regulate anti-
competitive cartel activities effectively. To discuss this argument, the competition policies
and laws of three emerging economies, namely South Africa, India, and Brazil, are com-
pared with the competition law of the European Union. This country selection was made
based on their shared category as emerging and developing, as well as Newly Industrial-
ized Countries (NICs)8 reflecting on their similarities in terms of market nature, eco-
nomic impact, and potential market challenges. Brazil and India are members of the so-
called BRICS group.9 South Africa is the youngest member of the (former) BRIC group
and the strongest single emerging economy on the African continent.10 Another similar-
ity is the fact that all three states are member parties to the International Competition
Network (ICN)1 but not to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), whose members are mostly developed nations.12 These organizations, to-
gether with organizations such as the European Union and other regional anti-
competition bodies, play an important role to ensure that cartels are identified, investi-
gated, and subsequently regulated in terms of international and domestic competition leg-
islation and policies of the countries affected. Subsequently, the role and functions of
these two organizations regarding limiting anti-competitive activities, especially cartels,
are scrutinized within the scope of the chosen domestic jurisdictions.
The article also provides an insight into cartel activities in these three emerging econo-
mies and poses the question as to which of the existing methods of cooperation is the most
effective one for addressing cartel activities. It provides a short overview of the existing
international institutions and enforcement bodies, which promote and coordinate interna-
tional competition policies and anti-cartel initiatives. The cooperation methods identified
and utilized by the ICN13 will be briefly analyzed in order to support the authors' view on
8. See PAWEL BoZYK, GLOBALIZATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN EcoNoMIC POLICY
164 (2006), for an overview of these newly industrialized countries. Go to World Economic Outlook FAQ,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm#q4b (last visited Jan.
15, 2012) for an overview of criteria used by the IMF to distinguish different categories of market economies.
9. BRICS, named after its members Brazil, Russia, India, China and since April 2011, South Africa, re-
semble a group of "countries considered economically significant . . . who view themselves as an emerging
centre of gravity in the global economy." Mzukisi Qobo, The BRIC Pitfalls and South Africa's Place in the
World, SUNDAY INDEPENDENT (Apr. 17, 2010), available at http://www.saiia.org.zalgreat-powers-africa-opin-
ion/the-bric-pitfalls-and-south-africa-s-place-in-the-world.html. See also BRIC Invite: Sign of China's African
Ambitions, AFRICA MONITOR: SOUTHERN AFRICA (BUSINESS MONITOR INTERNATIONAL), Mar. 1, 2011
[hereinafter BRIC Invite], in which the BRIC group was described as "a group of leading emerging markets
that will become increasingly important in the global economy over the long term. The nations are broadly
characterized by fast economic growth, rapid reforms, and business-friendly environments."
10. South Africa joined the BRIC group in April 2011, see BRIC Becomes BRICS-South Africa as a Gateway
to the Continent, MONEY WATCH AFRICA, May 12, 2011, http://www.moneywatchafrica.com/2011/05/bric-
becomes-brics-south-africa-as.html; see also BRIC Invite, supra note 9.
11. For more information on the ICN, go to http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/.
12. See List of OECD Member Countries, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en_2649_-2011
8518894021Il1l,00.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012), for a list of the OECD member states.
13. See INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, CO-OPERATION BE-WEEN COMPETITION AGENCIES IN CAR-
TEL INVESTIGATIONS (2006), available qt http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/
doc348.pdf, submitted at the ICN annual conference held in Moscow in May 2007.
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the relevance and importance of bilateral cooperation agreements for the conclusion of
successful cartel investigations.
H. Competition Law and the Concentration of Market Power in Cartels
and Multinational Corporations: A Legislative Overview
A. CARTELS AND ANTI-CARTEL LEGISLATION
The following four legislative examples stress the common aim of regulating competi-
tion law, maximizing consumer welfare, and preventing market distortion by means of
anti-trust applications.
Cartels constitute an association of manufacturers or suppliers that aims to maintain
high prices and restrict competition: the European Union's competition commission de-
fines cartels as "a group of similar, independent companies which join together to fix
prices, to limit production or to share markets or customers between them ... As a conse-
quence, their clients (consumers or other businesses) end up paying more for less
quality."'4
The OECD regards anti-trust measures as a way of ensuring consumer welfare, the
"individual benefit derived from the consumption of goods and services," by maximizing
consumer surplus of such consumption while also ensuring the well-being of the produc-
ers of such services.' 5 The organization explicitly warns of the negative impact that so
called "hard core cartels" can have and warns of their negative impact on market equity:
"They injure consumers in many countries by raising prices and restricting supply, thus
making goods and services completely unavailable to some purchasers and unnecessarily
expensive for others."16
Under South African competition legislation, cartel activities are prohibited under sec-
tion 4 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, as amended 7 (the Act): any involvement in such
cartel activities may lead to administrative'8 as well as possible criminal sanctions against
the companies and the directors involved.1 9 South African competition legislation does
not provide a concise definition of the term cartel. Instead, the Act lists examples of
corporate activities that could qualify as cartel activity. Section 4(1) stipulates that:
An agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association
of firms, is prohibited if-(a) it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if it
14. European Commission's competition overview at Overview: Cartel, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/indexen.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
15. See OECD, GLOSSARY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION LAw 29, 53,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf
16. OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST HARD
CORE CARTELS 1 (1988), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf.
17. See Competition Act No. 89 of 1998, § 3(1-2) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/
numact/cal998149.pdf, where the South African legislative framework is discussed in more detail.
18. See id. §§ 59-61.
19. Criminal prosecution against directors or management who cause a firm to engage in a prohibited
practice will soon be possible in South Africa after this Act comes into effect. Competition Amendment Act
No. I of 2009, § 12 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Files/Competition-Amendment-
Act.pdf.
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has the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market [. . .] or
(b) it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices.20
This definition of collusive anti-competition activity is reiterated in India's anti-cartel
legislation, with section 1 of the Indian Competition Act 21 defining a cartel as: "an associ-
ation of producers, sellers, distributors, traders or service providers who, by agreement
amongst themselves, limit, control or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale
or price of, or, trade in goods or provision of services." 22
The Brazilian Act 23 (hereinafter Federal Law), like the South African statute, lacks a
clear definition of a cartel. Section 20 of the Federal Law only contains a rather wide
definition of collusive actions qualifying as anti-competitive in order to include any anti-
competitive practices between competitors: "any act in any way intended or otherwise able
to produce the effects listed below, even if any such effects are not achieved, shall be
deemed an infringement of the economic order."
Section 20 then provides a catalogue of generally infringing "prohibited" activities such
as distortion of competition or free enterprise, control of the relevant product market, and
profiteering and abusing a company's market dominance.24 Section 21 of the Federal Law
lists certain acts that generally constitute a violation of the "economic order," including
price fixing, 25 concerted practices, 26 and the practice of "apportion[ing] markets for fin-
ished or semi-finished products or services, or for supply sources of raw materials or inter-
mediary products," 27 which is of a particular relevance for a state of the developing world
due to its economic ramifications.28
These three legal definitions and regulations of cartel activities in South Africa, Brazil,
and India follow the overall rationale and formula of prohibited cartel activities of the
European Union. Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning on the European Union
(TFEU) (former Article 81 of the EC Treaty) defines anti-competitive cartel activities as,
"all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal
market."29
Anti-competitive cartel agreements, decisions, and concerted practices deemed incom-
patible with the internal market resemble "prohibited" practices listed in Article
20. Competition Act No. 89 of 1998, § 4(1)(a-b). Section 4(1)(b) concerns anticompetitive practices such
as price fixing, market sharing/division, or collusive tendering.
21. Competition Act of 2002, 2003, No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India), available at http://www.
unctad.org/sections/ditc_ccpb/docs/ditc-ccpb.nclIndia-en.pdf.
22. Id. § 2.
23. See Brazilian Antitrust Law, Decreto No. 8884/94, de II de junho de 1994, DIAmo OFCIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 13.6.1994 (Braz.).
24. Id. § 20.
25. Id. § 21(I).
26. Id. § 21(II).
27. Id. § 21(III).
28. For more violations of the Federal Law, see id. § 21
29. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 101(1) Mar. 20,
2010, 2010 0J. (C 83/47) [hereinafter TFEU].
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101(1)(a)-(e) TFEU, including "price fixing," exclusive distribution and purchasing agree-
ments, and selective distribution and franchise agreements.30
B. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MARKET DOMINANCE AND ANTI CARTEL
COOPERATION
Globalization has seen the rise of so-called multi-national corporations (MNCs) or
multi-national enterprises (MNEs). The OECD defines MNCs as "companies or other
entities established in more than one country and so linked that they may co-ordinate
their operations in various ways".31 The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Tri-
partite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy
defines MNCs as "Multinational enterprises include enterprises, whether they are of pub-
lic, mixed or private ownership, which own or control production, distribution, services or
other facilities outside the country in which they are based." 32
The economic impact of MNCs is quite significant and increasing: U.S. scholar
Blumberg describes the impact of such MNC/M1NEs on global trade and business:
In the modern global economy, the largest corporations conduct worldwide opera-
tions. They operate in the form of multinational corporate groups organized in "in-
credibly complex" multi-tiered corporate structures consisting of a dominant parent
corporation, sub holding companies, and scores or hundreds of subservient subsidiar-
ies scattered around the world. The 1999 World Investment Report estimated that
there are almost 60,000 multinational corporate groups with more than 500,000 for-
eign subsidiaries and affiliates.33
Business activities of MNCs with their headquarters registered in the developed world
are often subject to strict competition or antitrust laws. The spatial dimension of such
limitations (which limits such governance to the boundaries of the nations of the devel-
oped world) does seldom extend to the many group subsidiaries that carry out the business
in the developing world where they are registered for the actual business operation.
MNCs operate in different states, including emerging economies through subsidiaries,
branches, and alliances. These subsidiaries, branches, or alliances might get involved in
cartel activities in the developing host country where standards of competition or antitrust
legislation and regulations are often underdeveloped or even absent. The U.S. Depart-
ment ofJustice addresses this absence of corporate accountability: "We observe that firms
in some cartels compete in the U.S. while conspiring elsewhere." 34
30. Id. art. 101(1)(a-e).
31. OECD, OECD GUIDELINFS FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES ] 3, at 14 (2008), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
32. Iwr'L LABOUR ORG., TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL
ENrERPRISES AND SOCIAL. POLICY 6 (2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-
edemp/-emp-ent/--multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf.
33. Phillip 1. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations Under United States Law:
Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 Am. J. COMP. L. 493, 493 (2002).
34. J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., What Do You Know?, Remarks to the British Inst. of
Int'l Comparative Law Sixth Annual Trans-Atlantic Antitrust Dialogue (July 6, 2006), available at 2006 WL
4422979.
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The International Commission of Jurists reflects on such shortcomings of corporate
accountability and governance in a 2008 report, when it states that:
Throughout different jurisdictions the basic principle is that the conduct of a subsidi-
ary will not be identified with its parent for the purposes of assigning legal responsi-
bility. This means that a parent company will not generally be held vicariously liable
for its subsidiary's conduct, even in situations where it holds 100% of its subsidiary's
shares.3s
Consequently, effective international multi-lateral anti-cartel competition policy is
needed to close this "accountability" gap. Such a step, however, requires close coopera-
tion between the competition authorities of the state where the holding company is regis-
tered and the state where the subsidiary is operating. Parisi emphasizes the need for more
cooperation regarding competition matters:
As business concerns have increasingly pursued foreign trade and investment oppor-
tunities, antitrust compliance issues have arisen which transcend national borders
and, thus, have led antitrust authorities in the affected jurisdictions to communicate,
cooperate, and coordinate their efforts to achieve compatible enforcement results.36
Greater international cooperation can lead to a speedy and effective investigation of
such cartel activities. As a consequence, corporate accountability in general will be
achieved and with it future corporate perpetrators deterred. An overall facilitation of the
enforcement of competition law and policies will eventually benefit the MNC affected,
which can concentrate on its core business instead of facing a dragged out competition
investigation by multiple completion organizations.
C. PROMOTION AND COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICIES
1. The Promotion of International Competition Policies
Multilateral cooperation in competition matters takes place by international organiza-
tions that aim at promoting cooperation between competition authorities and harmoniza-
tion of existing competition frameworks. This article looks at the role of the International
Competition Network, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the World Trade Organ-
ization. These bodies exist alongside other regional arrangements and mechanisms re-
sponsible for creating and enforcing competition policies such as the European
Commission of the European Union. 37
35. Isr'L COMM'N OF JURIsTS, CORPORATE COMPLICrTY & LEGAL AccouNrABILrrY 47 (2008), available
at http://www.ic).org/dwn/database/Volume3-ElecDist.pdf.
36. John J. Parisi, Enforcement Co-operation Among Antitrust Authorities, 20(3) EUR. COMPETITION L. REv.
133, 133 (1999).
37. The European Commission oversees competition policy within the European Union. See About the
European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/about/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
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a. The International Competition Network
The International Competition Network (ICN) was launched on October 25, 2001 by
fourteen states including the United States, European Union, Australia, and South Af-
rica.38 Budzinski describes the ICN as "a network of competition agencies from around
the world, with close interaction of other public and private players who are concerned
with international competition issues." 39 Ugarte identifies a general lack of international
collaboration as a key reason for the establishment of the ICN: "[tihe ICN was born out
of the recognition by many jurisdictions that multilateral efforts are necessary to ensure
convergence and coordination within and between the growing numbers of competition
nforcement systems around the world." 40 The ICN provides domestic competition au-
thorities throughout the world with a specialized but informal platform to maintain con-
tact and address competition concerns.41 It assists domestic competition authorities in the
enforcement of competition laws and other competition policies. The ICN operates
through specialized working groups and one of these is the working group for cartels. It
helps in addressing and governing cartel activities inside and outside the jurisdiction of the
member states. The cartel working group is responsible for addressing particular chal-
lenges faced by competition authorities when acting against so called "hardcore" cartels.
Aims and objectives of the ICN are summarized by Budzinski, who sees the main goal of
the ICN as "the promotion of convergence in competition policies, primarily concerning
procedural issues but, in the long run, also concerning substantive issues."
42
b. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been in
existence since 1961.43 Its predecessor, the Organization for European Economic Coop-
eration (OEEC) was established in 1947 with the aim to administer economic and devel-
opment aid in Europe received from the United States and Canada under the Marshall
Plan for the reconstruction of post war Europe.44 The OECD, in its current form, pro-
vides a discussion forum for states which are "committed to democracy and market econ-
omy" in order to "support sustainable economic growth, boost employment, raise living
standards, maintain financial stability, assists other countries' economic development and
contribute to growth in the world trade."4 5 At present it has thirty-four member states
with most of the industrialized nations as members of the organization.46 The OECD's
38. Cf Oliver Budzinski, The International Competition Network: Prospects and Limits on the Road Towards
International Competition Governance, 8(3) COMPETITION & CHANGE 223, 227 (2004).
39. Id.
40. Fernando S. Ugarte, The Int'l Competition Network: Achievements So Far, 22(10) INT'L FIN. L. REv. 1, 5
(2003).
41. About the ICN, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
42. Budzinski, supra note 38, at 223-42.
43. See About the ICN, supra note 41.
44. See History of the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052-36761863_II___11,00.
html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012); see also OECD COLUMBIA ELEC. ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2011).
45. About OECD, CORP. SUSTAINABILrrY REPORTING, http://www.reportingcsr.org/oecd-p-41.htmi (last
visited Jan. 15, 2012).
46. Chile, Slovenia, Israel, and Estonia joined as its latest members in 2010. See OECD Members & Part-
ners, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052-36761800 1__ll_1 ,00.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2012).
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Competition Committee is responsible for competition or antitrust matters.47 One of the
Committee's recent reports highlighted the high priority the organization places on com-
petition law.48 It publishes annual peer-reviewed reports of states and their competition
policy structure. These reports provide other competition agencies with a detailed over-
view on the progress of the competition policies and laws of countries that were reviewed.
These reports are then released to the states that were subject to these reports and a
further summary of the report is made available to the wider public by the Secretary Gen-
eral of the OECD.49
c. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
The first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) took
place in 1964.50 It "provided a new forum, for the comprehensive review of trade, aid, and
financial question related to development."5 "It undertakes research, policy analysis, and
[economic] data collection."5 2 It further "provides technical assistance . . . [to] developing
countries" that intend to develop and implement competition law and policy.53 The so-
called Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy meets on an
annual basis to consult on matters of interest regarding competition laws and policy.5 4 It
offers a voluntary peer-review mechanism for competition law and policy to developing
countries that is undertaken by UNCTAD competition policy experts.55
d. World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (WTO), which regulates global trade, provides the fo-
rum for countries for the initiation of trade negotiations.5 6 A Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) was established in 1996
after a Ministerial Conference in Singapore.57 Under the more recent Doha Declaration
of 2001, the WGTCP "focus[es] on the clarification of core principles, including trans-
parency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness; provisions on hardcore cartels; mo-
dalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity building."ss
47. Id.
48. See OECD COMPETITION Comm., BEST PRACrICES FOR THE FOlUWAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
BETWEEN COMPETIION AUTHORITIES IN HARD CORE CARTEL INVESTIGATIONs 2 (2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/33/35590548.pdf.
49. OECD, COMPFTITION POLICY IN OECD COUNTRIES 1993-1994, at 3 (1997).
50. Isaiah Frank, Aid, Trade and Economic Development: Issues Before the U.N. Conference, 42 (2) FOREIGN
AFF. 210 (1964).
51. Richard N. Gardner, United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, 22 (1) INT'L ORG. 120 (1968).
52. About UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.orgfremplates/Page.asp?intItemlD=1530&lang=1 (last visitedJan.
15, 2012).
53. Id.
54. See UNCTAD Competition Law & Policy, http://www.unctad.orgfremplates/StartPage.aspintltemlD=22
39&lang=1 (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
55. Id.
56. See generally Ed Brown, Jonathan Cloke & Mansoor Ali, How We Got Here: The Road to GATS, 8(1)
PROGRESS IN DEv. STUDIEs 7-22 (2008).
57. See World Trade Organization, Interaction Between Trade & Competition Policy, http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/tratop.e/comp e/compe.htn (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
58. Id. At present the WGTCP is dormant due to the present limitations during the Doha round.
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e. European Union
Competition policy in the European Union (EU) is supervised and enforced by the
European Commission, Directorate General for Competition, as the chief EU organ for
competition policies and law:
The mission of the Directorate-General for Competition [of the European Commis-
sion] is to enforce the competition rules of the Community [Union] Treaties, in order
to ensure that competition in the EU market is not distorted and that markets oper-
ate as efficiently as possible[, thereby] contribut[ing] to the welfare of consumers and
to the competitiveness of the European economy.59
Other competition institutions within the EU are the European Courts, the General
Court, and the European Court of Justice under Article 19(1) Treaty of the European
Union (TEU), which serve as judiciary instance in cases of appeal under Article 263 of the
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
(ex. Article 230 EC Treaty pre Lisbon) and referral by the courts of individual member
states under Article 267 TFEU (ex. Article 234).60 Under Article 3 of Regulation 1/
2003,61 implementation and enforcement of EU competition law takes place in a decen-
tralized form by means of cooperation between the European Commission and the na-
tional competition authorities established under domestic competition laws.62
Additionally, there exist bilateral antitrust agreements between the EU and selected
other states with the explicit goal of harmonizing enforcement actions and avoiding en-
forcement clashes between the EU and other jurisdictions. Currently, the EU has such
bilateral agreements with Canada, Japan, and the United States, as well as further country-
specific agreements. 63
Such bilateral agreements are necessary for overall compliance with EU competition
law and its extraterritorial application: "One of the reasons why Europe and the USA
entered [into] these agreements was the importance of addressing anti-competitive activi-
ties that occur beyond the effective reach of a jurisdiction, but affect it nonetheless be-
cause of the internationalisation of today's markets."M
2. Coordinating Cooperation Between Competition Agencies
"One aspect of cooperation in the field of competition is related to law enforcement
issues but there is also a fair amount of cooperation on broader issues such as competition
59. See DG Competition Mission Statement, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/mission (last visited Jan. 15,
2012).
60. See SYLVIA HARGREAvEs, EU LAW CONCENTRATE 62-63 (2d ed. 2011).
61. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 is a regulation on the implementation of
the rules on competition laid down in (former) Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (now Articles 101 and 102
TFEU). See Antitrust Regulations, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/regulations.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2012).
62. See KJ Cseres, The Impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the New Member States, 6(2) COMPETITION L. REv.
145, 147 (2010).
63. See Bilateral Relations on Competition Issues, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/intemational/bilateral (last
visited Jan. 15, 2012). The 1991 bilateral agreement with the United States is the most developed one.
64. Markus Muller, The European Commission's Decision Against Microsoft: A Violation of the Antitrust Agree-
ments Between the United States and the European Union?, 26(6) EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 309 (2005).
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advocacy or the proper design of competition laws and competition law enforcement insti-
tutions." 65 The impact of such collaboration on competition issues increases when cou-
pled with additional efforts to achieve harmonization of commercial practice:
The review of commercial practices involves considerable work and costs, both for
competition authorities and for the businesses whose conduct is subject to review. If the
same commercial practice falls within several jurisdictions the costs increase accordingly.
Greater cooperation and the elimination of unnecessary duplication of effort, can reduce
costs to competition authorities and business alike'66
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) like South Africa have experienced an increase
of-mostly foreign-MNC and MINE business activities. Consequently, they identified
international trans-border competition cooperation as a way of completing investigations
into cartel and anti-competitive activities in a time-efficient and effective way.67 Success-
ful trans-border competition cooperation may deter companies from committing cartel
offences. Noting the absence of an established and operational system of cooperation in
cartel cases, the Cartel Working Group of the ICN investigated possibilities of closer
cooperation between the competition authorities of multiple jurisdictions in a report sub-
mitted to the ICN's annual conference in Moscow in 2007.68 The report analyzed differ-
ent methods that might ensure greater cooperation, including those discussed below.
a. Informal Cooperation 69
This method is based on the 1995 OECD Recommendation on Cooperation. The
OECD recommendations provide a broad outline on how member states should deal with
"exchanges of information, co-operation in investigations and proceedings, consultations
and conciliation of anticompetitive practices affecting international trade."70 The ICN
points out that there is an overall lack of precedence where this method of cooperation
was used during cartel investigations. 71'
65. Frederic Jenny, International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and Perspective, 48 ANTITRUST
BULL. 973, 974 (2003).
66. Leon Brittan & Karel van Miert, Towards an International Framework ofCompetition Rules, 24 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 454, 455 (1996).
67. See generally SALLY VAN SICLEN, SOUTH AFRICA-PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
47 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/58/34823812.pdf (The peer reviewed OECD report
stated that "South Africa has no formal co-operation agreements with other competition agencies. But even
without formal arrangements, the Commission has worked with the European Commission, Canada, Austra-
lia, and the US in merger matters."). Such trans-border cooperation takes place in connection to merger as
well as cartel activities.
68. See ICN CENTRAL WORKING GROUP, CO-OPERATION BETWEEN COMPETITION AGENCIES IN CAR-
TEL INVESTIGATIONS (hereinafter ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT) 5 (May 2007), available at
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc348.pdf; see also Jenny, supra note 65, at
974, 978 (discusses the importance of international cooperation in competition matters and the various "tools
of cooperation"); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The International Dimension of Competition Policy, 17 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 833, 835-37 (1993) (the successful use of bilateral agreements in situations where uncompetitive
practices have extraterritorial effects).
69. See ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 68, at 9; Jenny, supra note 65, at 978.
70. See OECD, REVISED RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN
MEMBER COUNTRIES ON ANTICOMPETrIVE PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 6 (1995),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/42/21570317.pdf.
71. ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 68, at 9.
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The authors submit that voluntary cooperation by competition authorities needs overall
willingness and commitment by each participant-something that might often not be the
case.
b. Cooperation Based on Waiver 72
This method applies in cases where a transnational company involved in a cartel applies
for immunity or leniency7 3 in more than one competition jurisdiction. The company ef-
fectively authorizes the respective domestic competition authorities to exchange sensitive
information on a particular competition case. This method can only be successful if the
competition legislation or policies of the competition jurisdictions involved contain im-
munity or leniency provisions that are comparable. 74 South Africa, Brazil,75 and India7 6
have similar leniency programs under which a corporation under investigation for alleged
cartel activities may apply for immunity from prosecution.77 Consequently, any competi-
tion cooperation between these states should not be problematic in such an instance. In
South Africa, the Corporate Leniency Policy was "developed . .. to facilitate the process
through which firms participating in a cartel are encouraged to disclose information on
the cartel conduct in return for immunity from prosecution."7 8
The authors submit if one of the jurisdictions in which the cartel operates lacks such a
leniency program, this model of cooperative leniency might fail.
c. Cooperation Based on National Laws
Domestic competition legislation and policies may contain provisions that authorize
competition agencies to establish collaborative arrangements with agencies from other
jurisdictions.79 Germany, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Aus-
tralia are among the countries with legislation containing provisions of such bilateral ef-
fect.80 As an example, section 82(4) of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998
provides for such cooperation agreements with other competition agencies: "The Presi-
dent may assign to the- Competition Commission any duty of the Republic, in terms of an
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id. This ensures that the company will not be prosecuted if it provides the investigative competition
authorities with all the necessary information it will need to prosecute participants of the cartel. Id.
74. Id.
75. SDE, FIGHTING CARTELS: BRAZIL'S LENIENCY PROGRAM 17, 20 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/52/22/43619651.pdf. The publication states that "the SDE is the antitrust agency with power
to negotiate the leniency agreement" and further states the requirements that an applicant has to comply with
before the SDE will consider to enter into a leniency agreement. Id.
76. Section 46 of the Competition Act provides that "[t]he [Competition] Commission [of India] may, if it
is satisfied that any producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider included in any cartel, which is
alleged to have violated section 3, has made a full and true disclosure in respect of the alleged violations and
such disclosure is vital, impose upon such producer, seller, distributor, trader or service provider a lesser
penalty as it may deem fit, than leviable under this Act or the rules or the regulations." The Competition
(Amendment) Act, 2007, No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2007, § 46 (India). However, this possibility is subjected
to certain provisos. Id.
77. See id.; SDE, supra note 75, at 17; Corporate Leniency Policy §§ 3.1, 3.5 (S. Afr.).
78. Corporate Leniency Policy § 2.5 (S. Afr.).
79. ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 68, at 11.
80. Id. at 13.
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international agreement relating to the purpose of this Act, to exchange information with a
similar foreign agency." 81
Considering the fact that such cooperation is only limited to a few states, is voluntary,
and takes place on an ad hoc basis, it might still lack the necessary impact.
d. Cooperation Based on Non-Competition Specific Agreements Between
Jurisdictions82
So-called Mutual Assistance Agreements can be invoked if states need mutual assistance
in regard to combating cartel activities.83 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are
mostly entered into by countries to cooperate in criminal cartel matters. 4 However, the
ICN states that there is no automatic need for a "dual criminality" element when coopera-
tion is sought: the criminality of cartels in one jurisdiction does not necessarily prevent
cooperation on cartels by a Mutual Assistance Agreement if no such criminal status is
given to cartels in the other jurisdiction. It may, however, lead to limited or no coopera-
tion at all if one jurisdiction gives criminal status to cartels and the other one does not.8 5
The South African Competition Amendment Act I of 2009 grants criminal status to car-
tels in South Africa86 and therefore it is possible for South Africa to enter into such
MLATs with other countries that have the same criminal approach to cartels.
e. Regional Cooperation Instrument: The European Union Cooperation Network
All member states of the European Union belong to the European Competition Net-
work (ECN).87 Its key guardian is the European Commission, which is responsible for
ensuring the compliance of all EU member states with its competition policies. Regula-
tion (EC) 1/200388 of December 16, 2002, introduced a system of decentralized enforce-
ment executed by domestic enforcement bodies-the so-called national competition
authorities (NCAs). The ICN regards the EU enforcement network as an example for a
successful regional cooperation regime.89 When the Lisbon Treaty came into force in
December 2009, it gave legal personality to the European Union under Article 46A Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union; but we have yet to see whether this new
capacity to enter into international treaties will further strengthen the EU competition
network.
81. Id. at 13-14.
82. Id. at 15.
83. Id. (the ICN describes Mutual Assistance Agreements as "treaties on co-operation in criminal matters
which create hard law obligations on signatories.").
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Competition Amendment Act I of 2009 § 12 (S. Afr.).
87. P.S.R.F. MATHuSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 228 (2004).
88. Regulation 1/2003 introduced a system of decentralized enforcement executed by domestic enforce-
ment bodies, the so called national competition authorities (NCAs).
89. ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 68, at 19; OECD REPORT, supra note 70.
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f. Cooperation Based on Competition-Specific Agreements Between Jurisdictions or
Bilateral Agreements on Competition Matters
The common purpose of these agreements is to promote cooperation between competi-
tion authorities. 90 The ICN reports that the first bilateral agreement was concluded be-
tween Germany and the United States of America in 1976.91 Since then, many such
bilateral agreements followed: the United States of America and Brazil,92 Canada and
Brazil, 93 Chile and Brazil,94 and Russia and Brazil9 5 have all entered into such bilateral
agreements.
Considering the above methods of coordinating cooperation between competition au-
thorities, cooperation based on competition-specific agreements between jurisdictions or
bilateral agreements on competition matters seems to be by far the most promising
method. Not only do the participating parties retain a high amount of flexibility in terms
of identifying anti-competitive practices on which they want to cooperate, but they also
have the guarantee that if a competition matter arose they would be able to rely on the
cooperation of the country with which the bilateral agreement was concluded. This ob-
servation reiterates the earlier ascertainment of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission,
whereas "[c]o-operation among antitrust authorities facilitates the effective and efficient enforce-
ment ofantitrust laws and thus the maintenance ofcompetition in markets. That is not an expres-
sion of economic theory, but rather a fact of hfe.') 6
D. A CoMPARATIvE OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY OF THE
EURoPEAN UNION, SouTH AFRcA, BRAZIL, AND INDIA
1. Overview
The following overview introduces and compares the competition policy and laws in
South Africa, Brazil, and India with those of the European Union. It highlights the au-
thors' view that only binding bilateral agreements that synchronize domestic cartel laws
and policies-and not only informal cooperation agreements-are necessary to protect
90. ICN CARTEL WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 68, at 17.
91. See id.
92. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding Cooperation Between their Competition Authorities in the Enforce-
ment of their Competition Laws, U.S.-Braz., Oct. 26, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,068.
93. Cooperation Arrangement Between the Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau of the
Government of Canada, and the Council for Economic Defense, the Secretariat of Economic Law of the
Ministry ofJustice, and the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring of the Ministry of Finance of the Govern-
ment of the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, Can.-Braz.,
Apr. 25, 2008, competitionbureau.gc.ca.
94. Cooperation Arrangement Between the Fiscalia Nacional Econ6mica of Chile and the Council for
Economic Defense, the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring of the Ministry of Finance of the Government
of the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, Chile-Braz., Oct.
2008, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/AB%20Ingl6s.pdf.
95. Agreement on Cooperation in the Sphere of Competition Policy Between the Govermnent of the Fed-
erative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the Russian Federation, Russ.-Braz., Dec. 12, 2001, www.
oecd.org.
96. John J. Parisi, Enforcement Co-operation Among Antitrust Authorities, 20(3) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
133, 133 (1999).
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emerging economies from the threat of market distortion posed by cartels. Cross-border
cooperation established by bilateral agreements might speed up any investigation into car-
tel activities by MNCs. The outcomes of an investigation of an alleged transnational car-
tel activity undertaken by the anti-competition authorities of one jurisdiction can be
utilized by the competition authorities of other jurisdictions affected by such cartel activi-
ties, instead of having to conduct time-consuming investigations on their own.
2. European Union
As the main supervisory organ, the European Commission, together with its domestic
counterparts at the Member State level,97 functions as the 'gatekeeper' for fair competi-
tion and is responsible for the regulation and prevention of anti-competitive cartel activi-
ties under Article 101 TFEU (ex. Article 81 EC Treaty),9 8 the abuse of dominant positions
by dominating undertakings under Article 102 TFEU (ex. Article 82),99 and the regulation
of mergers under the Merger Regulation 139/2004.100 In addition, it oversees the fair use
of state aid by its Member States under Articles 107-109 TFEU (ex. Articles 87-89).1o1
The Commission has the power to adopt a decision, to conduct investigations, and to
impose penalties when following a complaint or on its own initiative if it finds in a given
case that there has been a violation of Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty. 102 The latter is
the measure that has the potential of deterring potential corporate offenders. Under Reg-
ulation 1/2003, the Commission has the power to impose fines on undertakings and as-
sociations of undertakings not exceeding ten percent of the total turnover realized in the
preceding business year by each of the undertakings that participated in the infringement
under Article 23 Regulation 1/2003103 and under Article 24 1/2003 periodic penalty pay-
ments not exceeding five percent of their average daily turnover in the preceding business
year per day in order to compel undertakings to put an end to an infringement or to
comply with a decision ordering interim measures.104
Penalties can be in the billions of euros-as two fines of 2009 exemplify. Two gas prov-
iders, E.ON and GDF Suez, were fined C553,000,000 each for their collusion in dominat-
ing the Franco-German gas market and the computer chip giant, Intel, was fined an
impressive C1,060,000,000 for its exclusion of other competitors from the computer chip
market.105
A major competition matter that made evident the positive effects of international co-
operation between competition authorities occurred in 1994, when Microsoft Corpora-
tion made a declaration to the U.S. Department of Justice and the European Competition
97. Council Regulation 1/2003, Preamble 9[l 3, 4, 2002 OJ. (L 1) 1 (EC).
98. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, Sept. 5, 2008,
2008 OJ. (C 115) 88-89 [hereinafter TFEU].
99. See id. art. 102.
100. Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 OJ. (L 24) (EC).
101. See TFEU, supra note 98, arts. 107-09.
102. See id. art. 105.
103. Reg 1/2003, art. 23.
104. Id. art. 24.
105. Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Action Against Cartels (July 8, 2009),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/faqs_en.htnl.
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Commission (ECC) to change their licensing practices. 06 This undertaking was made
after negotiations with these authorities, following an allegation by Novell against
Microsoft that the latter had kept competitors out of the market for PC-operating
browser system software by illegally tying Windows and Internet Explorer 07 and bun-
dling Windows Media Player with the Microsoft operating system. 0 8 The ECC allegedly
started its investigations in 2000 independently from the U.S. competition proceedings
that had already started in the early 1990s. 0 9 While investigations were ongoing,
Microsoft gave its consent for the exchange of information between the U.S. Department
ofJustice and the ECC. It waived its right to secrecy regarding both the U.S. Department
of Justice and the ECC."1o This cooperation was greeted as a success for international
cooperation:
[The negotiation of the undertaking was a historic and unprecedented piece of co-
operation between the EC Commission and the United States Department ofJustice.
It serves as an important model for the future, as it shows how the two authorities can
combine their efforts to deal effectively with giant multinational companies. The
success of this joint approach sends a strong signal to all multinational companies,
including those in other sectors."'
III. Republic of South Africa
A. LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW
At present, the only available action against cartel activity in South Africa is the admin-
istrative penalty as provided by the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the Act).1 2 It promotes
and protects fair competition in South Africa and came into force October 20, 1998."
The Preamble of the Act states that competition law and structures to enforce those laws
will "provide for markets in which consumers have access to, and can freely select, the
quality and variety of goods and services they desire" and it is also intended to "restrain
trade practices which undermine a competitive economy."14 It repealed the Maintenance
and Promotion of Competition Act of 1979 (the old Act), which regulated competition
among corporations.1s Chapter 2 of the Act prohibits uncompetitive practices that, inter
alia, include price fixing and price discrimination.1 6 Under section 61 of the Act, corpo-
rations involved in cartel activities may be penalized by an administrative fine of up to ten
percent of the annual turnover in South Africa or their exports from South Africa during
106. Press Release, European Commission, Following an Undertaking by Microsoft to Change its Licensing
Practices, the European Commission Suspends its Action for Breach of the Competition Rules (Sept. 17,
2004), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/94/653.
107. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
108. Commission Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft (EC).
109. See id. 1 4.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 (S. Afr.)
113. See id. Preamble.
114. See id.
115. See id. Schedule 2.
116. See id. ch. 2.
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the firm's preceding financial year."l7 When determining the penalty, the Competition
Tribunal shall look upon various factors, which include "the nature, duration, gravity, and
extent of the contravention, any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention,
and the behavior of the respondent."'I1
The scope of available sanctions will change when the Competition Amendment Act 1
of 2009 (the Amendment Act) comes into force. Corporate and company directors, such
as CEOs and CFOs, who are responsible for their undertakings' involvement in cartel
activities can now face personal criminal responsibility.119 South African legislators made
a bold move when drafting the Amendment Act. The then president of the Republic of
South Africa, Kgalema Mothathle, refused to sign the Competition Amendment Bill of
2008 (the Bill), as the Amendment Act then was called, questioning the constitutionality of
certain provisions.120 Firstly, there was the question of whether evidence obtained during
the hearing in front of the competition authorities could be used in a subsequent criminal
court case against directors.121 Secondly, the amendment takes away the burden of proof
from the South African prosecuting authorities under which they have to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that an offense was committed, in terms of the competition laws, by
stating that a person may be prosecuted for an offense if there is proof of or acknowledge-
ment by a firm that it engaged in a prohibited practice.122 Despite these concerns,123
Jacob Zuma, the present South African president, signed and assented to the Bill, which
became the Competition Amendment Act (Act No 1 of 2009), on August 26, 2009.124
Section 73A will be inserted into the Act, allowing the prosecution of a "[company] direc-
tor of a firm or while engaged or purporting to be engaged by a firm in a position having
management authority within the firm" 25 causing "the firm to engage in a prohibited
practice"1 26 or having "knowingly acquiesced"' 27to such activity.
It has yet to been seen whether the new Competition Amendment Act will create
enough deterrence to stop such anti-competitive activities.
B. ENFORCEMENr AGENCIES
In South Africa, the Competition Commission, the Competition Tribunal, and the
Competition Appeal Court were established by the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the Act)
117. See id. § 61(2).
118. See id. § 61(3).
119. See Segoane L. Momye & Sasha-Lee Afrika, Prison Beckons Directors Involved in Cartels, 16 JuTA's Bus.
L. 13, 13 (2008).
120. Luke Kelly, The Introduction of a Cartel Offence into South Afican Law, 21 STELLENBOSCH L. REv. 321
(2010).
121. The issue was also discussed at a joint meeting of the Law Society of South Africa's Competition Law
Committee and the Constitutional and Human Rights Committee, 8 De Rebus-SA Attorneys'Journal (2008).
122. Competition Amendment Bill, § 12 (2008); see also Kelly, supra note 120, at 331.
123. These concerns were not addressed as the Bill was assented to with exactly the same content. It is
therefore possible to expect future litigation after the commencement of the Amendment Act.
124. Competition Amendment Act (Act No. 1, 2009). It was assented to on August 26, 2009 while the date
of its entry into force has still not been proclaimed.
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and are responsible for enforcing competition legislation, policies, and domestic
compliance.
The Commission consists of a Commissioner and at least one Deputy Commissioner
who is appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry.128 The Commission has jurisdic-
tion throughout the Republic of South Africa, is independent, and is only subject to the
South African Constitution and the law of South Africa.129 It functions independently
from any interference by any executive organ of state and "each organ of state must assist
the Commission to maintain its independence and impartiality, and to effectively carry out
its powers and duties."1 30 The Commission has a wide range of implementation and en-
forcement powers'31 designed to protect the individual consumer's right to a fair market:
[The Commission is representing the public interest and acts as 'claimant cum pros-
ecutor'. The public interest is that interest that all South Africans have in open and
unfettered competition in our economy. The Commission is assigned to this task
because of the difficulties facing ordinary citizens in pursuing anti-competitive con-
duct through normal court channels.132
The Tribunal has jurisdiction throughout the Republic, and consists of a chairman who
is appointed by the President and at least three, but no more than ten, other members.
Under section 27(1), the Tribunal has the responsibility to adjudicate any matter that is
prohibited under the Act, which may be considered by it, and review any decision of the
Commission that gets referred to in terms of the Act.
Section 36 of the Act establishes the Competition Appeal Court, which has a similar
status as a High Court in South Africa. It consists of three judges, of whom one is desig-
nated to be the Judge President. The court is responsible for reviewing any decisions of
the Competition Tribunal referred to it in terms of the Act and for considering any appeal
arising from a decision of the Tribunal.
Overall, the three enforcement bodies have been successful in safeguarding corporate
compliance with South Africa's competition legislation as the case overview below shows.
C. A SHORT OVERVIEW OF SELECTED CARTEL CASES IN SoUTH AFRICA
In recent times, many corporations were under investigation for alleged cartel activities
by the Competition Commission. Such cartel activities include collaborations between
international MNCs and domestic South African companies, which affect the domestic
market; one good example was the well-publicized milk cartel case, involving corporations
such as Parmalat SA (Pty) Ltd., Clover SA (Pty) Ltd., and Nestle SA (Pty) Ltd.133 These
and other cartel activities, many which have not yet been discovered, prompt questions.
128. Id. § 19(2).
129. Id. § 20(1)(a).
130. Id. § 20(3).
131. Id. § 21.
132. Competition Comm'n v. Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd. 2010 (91/CAC/FeblO) ZACAC 2 (S. Afr.).
133. See Amanda Visser, Appeal Lodged in Milk Cartel Case, FiN24 (Sept. 19, 2008, 07:32), http://www.fin24.
com/BusBusin/Appeal-lodged-in-milk-cartel-case-20080919; see also S Africa: Regulator Upbeat on "Milk Car-
tel" Case, JUST-FOoD (Jan. 19, 2009), http://www.just-food.com/news/regulator-upbeat-on-milk-cartel-case
id105093.aspx.
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Are MNCs that operate in developing nations more likely to commit prohibited practices?
Do the respective national competition authorities, unlike their counterparts in developed
member states of the OECD, suffer from a general lack of formal cooperation in their
fight against cartels?
Cartel cases that the Commission has investigated include, inter alia, an alleged cartel in
the bread industry, a cartel operating in the pipe products and construction industry 34 in
which two subsidiaries of Murray and Roberts and Aveng were involved,135 and an alleged
milk cartel.136
1. The Bread Cartel: Competition Commission v. Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd.137
In the so-called "bread cartel" case, the Competition Commission of South Africa re-
ferred to the Competition Tribunal for a decision on two complaints against Pioneer
Foods (Pty) Ltd.; the Western Cape complaint and the National complaint concerned
alleged bread cartel activities at the regional and national level. In the Western Cape
complaint, the Commission received information about an alleged cartel between the
bread producers Premier Foods, Tiger Brands, Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd., and Pioneer Food.
These prohibited horizontal agreements138 between the cartel members aimed at dividing
the market by allocating certain areas for business operations to each participant and fix-
ing bread prices, thus contravening §§ 4(l)(b)(i) and (ii)139 of the Competition Act. Dur-
ing the investigation, Premier Foods decided to cooperate fully with the Commission in
order to qualify for immunity under the leniency policy of the Commission. During the
early stages of the investigation, Tiger Brands successfully entered into a consent order
agreement with the Commission after it provided evidence against the bread cartel. Tiger
Brands received an administrative fine of ZAR98.784.869.90. Foodcorp was fined an ad-
ministrative fine of ZAR45.406.359.82. Only the case of Pioneer Food-with the com-
pany denying involvement in any cartel-was referred to the Tribunal. The Tribunal
found that Pioneer Foods had indeed contravened § 4 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Act1 0 and
was punished with a rather robust penalty of ZAR195.718.614 for its involvement in both
the Western Cape and national bread cartel.
134. Competition Comm'n v. S. Pipeline Contractors Conrite Walls (Pry) Ltd. [20101 (23/CFR/FebO9) (S.
Aft.); see also Media Release, Competition Commission, Competition Counission Busts Pipe Products CartelGan. 30, 2009), http://www.compcom.co.zz/assets/Uploads/AttacheAttach/MyDocuments/30-Jan-09-Com-
petition-Commission-busts-pipe-products-cartel.pdf.
135. Amanda Visser, Cartel Firms Get Off Scot-Free, nsN24 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.fin24.com/Business/
Cartel-firms-get-off-scot-free-20090302.
136. Competition Comm'n v. Clover Indus. Ltd. [2008] (103/CR/Dec06) (S. Afr.).
137. Competition Comm'n v. Pioneer Foods (Pry) Ltd. 2010 (15/CR/FebO7) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Bread
Case].
138. Section I of the Competition Act defines a horizontal relationship as a relationship between competi-
tors and an agreement, when used in the context of prohibited practices, includes a contract, arrangement or
understanding, whether or not it is legally enforceable. Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 § 1(xi) (S. Afr.).
139. Id. § 4(l)(b)(i)-(ii) (S. Aft.).
140. Bread Case, supra note 137, at 131, namely "direct and indirect fixing of a selling price and other
trading conditions in contravention of section 4(l)(b)(i)and(ii) of the Act."
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2. Pipes and Construction Cartel: Competition Commission v. Cape Concrete Works
(Pty) Ltd. 141
In this 2009 case, the Commission found that corporations that operated in the pipe
products industry had formed a cartel and were responsible for bid rigging, price fixing,
and allocating markets or customers. In December, Rocla (Pty) Ltd. (Rocla) applied for
leniency to the Commission in terms of its Corporate Leniency Policy.14 2 It was involved
in a cartel with other corporations in the precast industry.143 Rocla informed the Com-
mission that, together with the other corporations, they "[fixed] the selling price of pipes,
culverts and manholes[;] [divided] the markets of the production and distribution of pipes,
culverts and manholes; and [collusively tendered] in respect of the supply of precast con-
crete products and precast concrete sleepers to certain suppliers."l44 The Commission
subsequently started an investigation into the cartel. Cape Concrete Works (Pty) Ltd.
admitted its involvement in the cartel and agreed, in a plea bargain with the Commission,
to pay a fine of ZAR 4.371.386.
3. The Milk Cartel: Competition Commission v. Clover Industries Limited, Clover SA (Pty)
Ltd., Parmalat (Pty) Ltd, Ladismith Cheese (Pty) Ltd., Woodlands Dairy (Pty)
Ltd., Nestle SA (Pty) Ltd., and Milkwood Dairy (Pty) Ltd.145
In the milk cartel case, the companies Clover Industries Ltd., Clover SA (Pty) Ltd.,
Parmalat (Pty) Ltd., Ladismith Cheese (Pty) Ltd, Woodlands Dairy (Pty) Ltd., Nestle SA
(Pty) Ltd., and Milkwood Dairy (Pty) Ltd. were accused of fixing the prices of raw and
processed milk and manipulating the market to restrict competition.'4 It was alleged that
price information was exchanged between the management of the corporations via tele-
phone and email.147 It was further alleged that price data were circulated and synchro-
nized by making use of a combination of fictitious and actual scenarios where each
participant would then provide the price it would charge for the provided scenario.148
During January 2009, the Commission issued a media statement in which it confirmed a
settlement with one of the participants in the milk cartel. 149 Lancewood (Pty) Ltd. admit-




145. See Competition Comm'n v. Clover Indus. Ltd. et. al. 2006 (103) CR 1 (CT) 1 34 (S. Afr.); Clover
Indus. Ltd. v. Competition Comm'n et. al. 2008 (78) ZACAC I (CAC) (S. Aft.); and Ladismith Cheese Ltd. v.
Competition Comm'n 2008 (81) ZACAC 1 (CAC) (S. Aft.) for the Competition Appeal Court's decision after
some of the dairy companies, including Clover Industries Limited, Clover SA (Pry) Ltd., and Ladismith
Cheese (Pry) Ltd. appealed against three in limine points. The first point was whether the letter that was
submitted to the Commission, informing the Commission of the possibility of a cartel amongst dairy
companies, qualified as an official complaint or only as providing the Commission with information. The
second and third in limine points were based on a corporate leniency agreement concluded between the
Commission and Clover Industries Limited and Clover (SA) Pry Ltd. on Feb. 3, 2006. The appeal, however,
failed on all three points in limine.
146. Media Statement, S. Afr. Competition Comm'n, Competition Commission Settles with Milk Cartel
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ted to the Commission that it was involved in the activities as alleged by the Commission
and agreed to pay an administrative penalty.of ZAR100,000.00.so
But the Commission recently withdrew its case against Clover Industries Limited and
Clover SA (Pty) Ltd., Nestle SA (Pty) Ltd., Parmalat (Pty) Ltd., and Ladismith Cheese
(Pty) Ltd.-the remaining respondents in its long running case.151 The withdrawal is due
to a decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa in which it sets aside the
complaints initiated by the Competition Commission against the applicants during 2006
and refers the December 7, 2006 Competition Commission complaints to the Competi-
tion Tribunal of South Africa.152
These cases highlight the important role South Africa's competition authority plays in
their quest to ensure fair and healthy competition in order to preserve economic
freedom.153
D. SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES
At the moment the Act provides for administrative penalties against corporations, which
can amount to a total of ten percent of the annual turnover made during the business year
in which the corporation was involved in the cartel activity. 54 The amended Act will
establish personal accountability of directors and other officers of the company by
criminalizing certain acts amounting to prohibited practices of their corporations.1ss
With this latter legislation in place, the South African competition penalty system will
finally become more in line with the examples of the United States,15 6 Canada, 5 7 and the
United Kingdom 5 that all make provisions for custodial sentences for directors who al-
low the corporation to get involved in cartels.
150. Id.
151. See Media Release, S. Afr. Competition Comm'n, Commission Withdraws Case against Clover, Ladis-
mith, Nestle, and Parmalat (Apr. 20, 2011), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/At-
tachedFiles/MyDocuments/final-media-release-on-the-milk-case.pdf.
152. Woodlands Dairy v. Milkwood Dairy 2010 (105) SA 1 (ZASCA) (S. Afr.); see also Ann Crotty, Milk
Cartel Ruling 'Terrible, SA TIME (Sept. 15, 2010), www.iol.co.za/businessfbusiness-news/milk-cartel-ruling-
terrible-1.692687.
153. There are more examples of cartel cases. In Competition Comm'n. v. New Reclamation Group 2008
(37) CR 1 (CT) (S. Mr.), the New Reclamation Group confessed to the Commission of its involvement in
fixing the price of scrap metal. It was punished with an administration fine of R145.972.065. In Competition
Comm'n. v. Adcock Ingram Critical Care & Tiger Brands Ltd. 2008 (20) CR 1 (CT) (S. Aft.), the Commis-
sion alleged "that the respondents allocated customers and specific types of goods and services during 2001
and 2002 and engaged in collusive tendering for the supply of large volume parenterals (intravenous medical
products) to State Hospitals during 1999 to 2007." Adcock Ingram admitted liability to the Commission
during the investigation and agreed to pay an administrative penalty of R53 502 800. This amount repre-
sented eight percent of Adcock Ingram's turnover for the financial year ending in 2007. See also Monnye &
Afrika, supra note 119.
154. Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 61(2) (S. Mr.).
155. See Monnye & Afrika, supra note 119.
156. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § I (2004).
157. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 § 45(2) (Can.).
158. Enterprise Act, (2002) § 188, 1 CURREwr LAW.
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E. CONCLUDING REMARKS
South Africa has an Agreement on Trade, Development, and Cooperation with the Eu-
ropean Union, 5 9 which extends to competition-related matters.o60 Article 35 of the
Agreement lists corporate agreements and concerted practices that are incompatible with
the validity of the Agreement and that could affect trade between the European Union
and South Africa, and where pro-competitive effects do not outweigh such anti-competi-
tive behavior.161
An infringement of the anti-competitive provisions of this agreement might lead to
direct assistance by the European Union in cases where the South African competition
authorities discover a cartel that might affect trade with the European Union or a cartel
that has operation in both South Africa and the European Union, thus having effect in the
European Union.
IV. Brazil
As a dynamic emerging market economy, Brazil has become the host country to many
MNCs. In the past, the Brazilian economy was largely centralized and the state took
responsibility for regulating and fixing prices.162 When this system was abolished in the
1990s, corporations enjoyed more economic operative freedom.163 Consequently, the
need for more stringent competition regulation arose to ensure that corporations did not
abuse their new position of economic freedom.'6 Changes to the competition legislation
formed part of many responses by the Brazilian government to high inflation.165 In 1994
a new competition law was enacted.166 Brazil has many cooperation agreements with
other countries' competition agencies. These include, inter alia, agreements with Canada,
the United States, Chile, the European Union, and Russia. 67
159. Agreement on Trade Development and Cooperation, E.C.-S. Afr., Jul. 29, 1999, 142 O.L.J. 311.
160. Id.
161. Id. art. 35, 1 1(a) includes "agreements and concerted practices between firms in horizontal relation-
ships ... which have the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in the territory of the
Community or of South Africa, unless the firms can demonstrate that the anti-competitive effects are out-
weighed by pro-competitive ones . . . . "
162. See GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, THE ANITRUsr REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS (2009), available at
http//www.globalcompetitionreview.com); see also John W. Clark, Competition Policy and Regulatory Re-
form in Brazil: A Progress Report, 2 OECD J. COMPEiION L. & POL'Y 1 (2000) for a comprehensive
summary on the competition law developments in Brazil.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See ORG. FOR EcoN. Co-OPERATFION AND DEV., CoMPETrION LAW AND POLICY IN BRAz. 10
(2010), available at http//www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/42/45154362.pdf.
166. Decreto No. 8884, de Junho de 1994, DIARIO OFicIAL DA UrNIAo [D.O.U.] de 11.6.1994 (Braz.).
167. All these agreements are retrievable from http//www.mj.gov.br/sde.
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A. THE LEGAL FRAMEwoIU AND PROHIBITED PRAcTIcEs
Brazil has various statutes that are intended to prevent anti-competitive activities such
as cartels.s68 Law No. 8,884/94, the Federal Competition Act (hereafter Federal Law),
Law No. 8,137/90; the Brazilian Economic Crimes Law, which criminalizes certain cartel
conduct;' 69 Law No. 10.446/02, which allows for investigations into cartels with interstate
or international impact; and the Presidential Decree of October 7, 2008, which designated
October 8 of each year as the annual Anti-Cartel Enforcement Day in Brazil. 70 It is no
coincidence that the first leniency agreement,' 7' in terms of the Brazilian Leniency Pro-
gram, came into effect on October 8, 2008. The subsequent proclamation of this day as
the official Anti-Cartel Day serves as a further indication of the Brazilian authority's com-
mitment to curb hardcore cartels. 172
The Federal Law promotes free competition and consumer protection. 73 It has juris-
diction.over "individuals, private or public companies, as well as any individual or corpo-
rate associations, established de facto and dejure [on the territory of Brazil]l 74-even on a
provisional basis -"irrespective of a separate legal nature, and notwithstanding the exer-
cise of activities" considered legal monopolies. 75 It further provides that the "company
and each of its managers of officers shall be jointly liable to the various forms of infringe-
ment of the economic order." 7 6 Articles 20 and 21 of the Federal Law define which
corporate behaviors qualify as a violation of the economic order. 77
168. INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT TEMPLATE, SUBGROuP 2: EN-
FORCEMENT TECHNIQUES 2 (2009), http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/Brazil_ICN%2OCartel%20Template-
April%202009.pdf.
169. Brazilian Economic Crimes Law, No. 8,137/90, § 4.
170. SECRETARIAT OF ECONOMIC LAW, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BRAZIL's ANIl-CARTEL PROGRAM, availda-
ble at http//www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
171. In terms of the Brazilian Leniency Program, which was launched in 2000, an agreement might be
negotiated by the SDE and an applicant for leniency if (i) the applicant is the first to come forward and
confesses his participation in the unlawful practice; (ii) the applicant ceases its involvement in the anticompe-
titive practice; (iii) the applicant was not the leader of the activity being reported; (iv) the applicant agrees to
fully cooperate with the investigation; (v) the cooperation results in the identification of other members of the
conspiracy, and in the obtaining of documents that evidence the anticompetitive practice; (vi) at the time the
company comes forward, the SDE has not received sufficient information about the illegal activity to ensure
the condemnation of the applicant. Secretariat of Economic Law et al., Fighting Cartels: Brazil's Leniency
Program, BRASil.A-DF, CEP 70064-900, 17, 20 (3rd ed. 2009)
172. See ANTn-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT TEMPLATE, supra note 168.
173. Federal Law, Decreto No. 8884: 1, de Junho de 1994, DImO OFIcIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
11.6.1994 (Braz.).
174. Id. art. 15 ("[A] foreign company is deemed resident in the Brazilian territory if it operates or has a
branch, affiliate, subsidiary, office or place of business, agent or representative in Brazil."); id. art. 2.
175. Id. art. 15.
176. Id. art. 16.
177. Id. art. 20. This includes any act that in any way intended or otherwise is able to limit, restrain or in
any way injure open competition or free enterprise; to control a relevant market of a certain product or
service; to increase profits on a discretionary basis; and to abuse one's market control.
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B. ENFORCmENT BODIES
The Brazilian Competition Policy System has three bodies178 for the enforcement of
the antitrust legislation:179 the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (Secretaria de Acom-
panhamento Econ6mico), which is part of the Finance Ministry; the Administrative
Council for Economic Defense (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica); and the
Secretariat of Economic Law Enforcement (Secretaria de Direito Econ6mico), which is
part of the Justice Ministry.
The Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (SEAE) is a governmental investigative
agency. Its main responsibilities include certain investigative and advisory duties under
the competition laws of Brazil, providing economic analysis for economic regulator pro-
grams and monitoring market conditions in Brazil. 80 The SEAE may issue non-binding
economic opinions in merger reviews and anti-competitive activities.' 8
The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) was created under Law
No. 4137 of September 1962.182 In terms of the Federal Law, CADE became a federal
independent agency with the responsibility to ensure compliance with the Federal Law
and its regulations.183 CADE's board consists of a president and six other board mem-
bers.184 Its duties include, inter alia, the task of resolving "purported violations of the
economic order" and applying the penalties provided by law, resolving "proceedings insti-
tuted by the Secretariat of Economic Law Enforcement," and ordering action to counter
possible violations of the economic order.s85
The Secretariat of Economic Law Enforcement (SDE) seems to be the Brazilian
equivalent to the South African Competition Commission and thus the chief investigative
body regarding anticompetitive activities 8 6 It is headed by a secretary who is appointed
by the Minister of Justice.187 SDE's duties include, among others, the enforcement of
market compliance with Brazil's Federal Law by monitoring and following up on market
practices.' 88
178. CADE, THE BRAZILIAN SysTEsM OF COMPETITION POLICY, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/
upload/WTOgenevaSBDCtradepolicy2.pdf.
179. OECD, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN BRAZIL: A PEER REVIEW 11 (2010), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/42/45154362.pdf.
ISO. See generally id. (discussing the various roles of the SEAE).
181. Id. at 29.
182. Federal Law, art. 3; PEER REVIEW, supra note 179, at 10.
183. Federal Law, art. 7.
184. Id. art. 4. These members are chosen from among citizens older than thirty years of age reputed for
their legal or economic knowledge and unblemished reputation, duly appointed by the President of the Re-
public of Brazil after their approval by the Senate.
185. Id. art. 7.
186. See Defensa da Concorrencia, http://www.mj.gov.br/sde (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
187. Federal Law, art. 13.
188. Id. art. 14(1) ("to ensure compliance with the Federal Law by monitoring and following up on market
practices") and art. 14(2) ( to "provide for ongoing follow-up on business activities").
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C. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CARTEL CASES IN REcENT YEARS
1. The Rio de Janeiro - Slo Paulo Airline Case'89
In this case, newspapers started the investigation into an affair, which became known as
the Sio Paulo Airline Case. It was alleged that presidents of certain domestic airlines
colluded in price fixing ticket prices for the Rio de Janeiro-Sio Paulo route, because all
the ticket prices were going up by ten percent. CADE found the airlines guilty of collu-
sion to increase prices and each airline was fined an amount equivalent to one percent of
their revenue on that route. 190
2. The Rio de Janeiro Newspaper Case'9 1
In this case, four newspapers in Rio de Janeiro increased their prices by the same price
and percentage rates. CADE investigated the matter and found the newspapers guilty of
anti-competitive behavior. Each paper was fined one percent of its annual revenue.192
3. The Flat Steel Cartel Case'93
This case concerned an agreement between competitors in the steel industry in which
the parties planned to increase the prices of flat-rolled steel products. SEAE discovered
that certain companies, which were members of the Brazilian Steel Institute, planned to
increase the price of flat steel simultaneously. SEAE informed the companies that their
plans could lead to a possible disturbance of the economic order; nonetheless, the compa-
nies proceeded with the increase. Reasons for the price adjustment, as provided by the
relevant companies, were considered unconvincing and the companies were found guilty
of price fixing. CADE fined each company one percent of their annual revenue before the
proceedings against them were filed.194
D. PENALTIES
Article 23 of the Federal Law determines the applicable penalties for anticompetitive
behavior that violates the economic order. Companies shall be fined one to thirty percent
of the gross, pre-tax revenue of the company in its latest financial year. The fine shall not
be lower than the actual competition advantage gained from the infringement. Managers
or other officers shall be fined ten to fifty percent of the fine imposed on the company,
and the manager will be personally liable for paying this fine. For other individuals and
public or private entities, as well as any de facto or de jure associations of entities or
persons, even temporary ones, with or without legal identity, the fine can total anywhere
189. See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION's ROUNDTABLE ON PROSECUTING CARTELS
WTHouT DIRECT EVIDENCE OF AGREEMENT: A CONTIRUTION BY BRAzIL 3-5 (2006), available at http:I//
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/28/36063750.pdf.
190. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: PEER
REVIEWS OF ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILI, MEXICO AND PERU 76 (2006).
191. See A CONTRIBUTION BY BRAZIL, spra note 189, at 82.
192. Id.
193. See Clark, supra note 162, at 193, for a summary of the case.
194. See A CONTRIBUTION BY BRAZIL, spra note 189, at 82.
WINTER 2011
1000 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
between six thousand and six million Brazilian real. In case of a repetition of such an
infringement, such fines can be doubled.195
V. India
A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Supreme Court of India stated the primary purpose of competition law is "to rem-
edy some of those situations where the activities of one firm or two lead to the breakdown
of the free market system, or, to prevent such a breakdown by laying down rules by which
rival businesses can compete with each other."' 9 6 The first competition legislation in In-
dia was the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 (MRTP Act), which
came into force in June 1970.197 The aim of the MRTP Act was to "provide that the
operation of the economic system did not result in the concentration of economic power
to the common detriment, for the control of monopolies, for the control of monopolistic
and restrictive trade practices and for matter connected therewith or incidental
thereto."l98 Indian authorities felt the need to keep competition policies in line with in-
ternational economic developments.199 In 1999, the Indian government appointed the
Raghavan Committee, a committee on Competition Policy and Law.200 In light of India's
growing role as a global economic player, the task of the Raghavan Committee was to
oversee Indian competition policies in order to ensure compliance with international com-
petition law developments. 201 Upon submitting the committee's report, the new Compe-
tition Act of 2002 (Competition Act) was enacted. The Competition Act came into effect
on September 1, 2009.202 The overall aim of the act is to "prevent practices that would
have an adverse effect on the development of fair competition, to promote and sustain
competition in the markets, to protect the interest of consumers and to ensure freedom of
trade carried on by other participants in markets in India."203 Section 3 of the Competi-
tion Act prohibits cartel activity in India "in respect of production, supply, distribution,
storage, acquisition or control or goods or provision of services which causes or is likely to
cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition."204 The Competition Act makes pro-
visions for the Competition Committee of India (CCI) to enter into any memorandum or
arrangement with any agency of any foreign country "for the purpose of discharging its
duties or performing its functions under this Act."205 This may be done with the prior
195. See Federal Law, art. 23.
196. Competition Comm'n of India v. Steel Authority of India, (2010) 10 S.C.C. 744, 744-45 (India).
197. ANURAG K AGARWAL, COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA: NEED TO GO SLOW AND STEADY 3 (2005)
available at http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/publications/data/2005-10-05anurag.pdf.
198. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, No. 54 of 1969, INDIA CODE (1969).
199. See ARGARWAL, supra note 197.
200. Debashree Dutta, New Competition Regime in India, LEGALSERVICEINDIA, http-//www.legalserviceindia.
com/articles/neew.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
201. Id.
202. GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, THE AsIA-PAcCC ArTITRUST REVIEW (2010), available at http//
www.globalcompetitionreview.com.
203. The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
204. Id. § 3(1).
205. Id. § 18.
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approval of the Central Government of India. 206 Consequently if the Indian competition
authorities feel that cartels will be addressed more efficiently through cooperation, it has
the possibility to cooperate with other countries. This intention of Indian authorities was
already noticeable during a BRIC international competition conference held in Kazan,
Russia. 207 The CCI issued a statement saying that "the (BRIC nations) resolved to take
effective measures to tackle cartels and anti-competitive agreements ... they also stressed
upon the need of co-operation and exchange of views and experiences on the matters
relating to competition policy development."208
B. ENFORCEMENT
The CCI was established under the Competition Act209 and became operational on
October 14, 2003.210 It "consist[s] of a Chairperson and not less than two and not more
than ten other Members [who are all] appointed by the Central Government [of In-
dia]."211 The CCI has "the duty ... to eliminate practices that have an adverse effect on
competition, promote and sustain competition, protect the interest of consumers and en-
sure freedom of trade carried on by other participants, in markets in India." 212 It has the
power to start inquiries into any alleged contravention of the Competition Act.213 The
Commission can make any order it deems fit should there be a contravention of the
Act.214 The Competition Amendment Act of 2007 amended the Competition Act. The
amendment makes provisions for the establishment of a Competition Appellate Tribunal
(CAT). The CAT may "hear and dispose of appeals against any direction issued or deci-
sion made or order passed by the [CCI]."215 The CAT "shall consist of a Chairperson and
not more than two other Members who will be appointed by the Central Government [of
India]."216 Any decision or order of the CAT may be challenged in the Supreme Court of
India.217
The revamp of the Indian competition regime also had implications for old cases, inves-
tigations, and proceedings started under the auspices of previous competition authorities.
The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MTRPC) was allowed two
years to complete open pending matters after the commencement of the Competition Act
in September 2009.218 From September 2011 on, open cases will be transferred to the
Appellate Tribunal for further adjudication. 219 Therefore, because the MTRPC was go-
206. Id.
207. BRIC Nations to Tackle Cartels Together, INDIANEXPRESS (Sept. 4, 2009, 1:23 AM), http://www.indian
express.com/news/bric-nations-to-tackle-cartels-together/512603.
208. Id.
209. The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 § 7(1), Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
210. Dep't of Co. Affairs, The Establishment of the Competition Commission of India, F. No. 1/10/2003-CL. V
(Oct. 14, 2003).
211. The 2002 Competition Act, § 8(1).
212. Id. § 18.
213. Id. § 19(1).
214. Id. § 27.
215. The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007, No. 70 § 53A(1)(a), Acts of Parliament, 2007 (India).
216. Id. § 53C.
217. Id. § 53T.
218. Id. cl. 50.
219. The 2002 Competition Act, § 66(3).
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ing to dissolve as current matters were taken care of, no new cases were taken by the
commission. All of the cases dealing with unfair trade practices, with a few exceptions, 220
were transferred to the National Commission, which was established in terms of the Con-
sumer Protection Act 68 of 1986 (Consumer Act). These cases will be adjudicated as if the
cases were filed under the Consumer Act.221
C. A SHORT OVERVIEW OF CARTEL INQUIRIES BEFORE THE CCI IN RECENT YEARs
1. The Glass Bottles Manufacturers' Inquiry222
In this case, a complaint was filed with the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission (MTRPC)223 and the complaint was transferred to the Competition Com-
mission after it started operating as India's competition enforcement body . The com-
plainant, All Indian Distillers' Association, alleged that four of India's major glass bottle
manufacturers had formed a cartel and were increasing the sale price of the glass bottles
arbitrarily on the pretext of the increase in raw material such as soda ash. The Competi-
tion Commission dismissed the case as being based on unsubstantiated rumors, thus not
confirming the existence of a cartel between the four glass bottles manufacturers because
as far as the allegation of cartelization by the respondent glass manufacturers is con-
cerned, no reliable material has been placed on record which can lend support to such
assertion. Definitely something more than bare allegations is needed to show con-
certed action on the part of the respondents to fix the prices of glass bottles.224
2. The Hard Disk Drive Industry Inquiry225
Here, a complaint was lodged against a multinational company that had its head office
in the Cayman Islands. The complaint alleged that the company, besides other competi-
tion law transgressions such as abusing its dominance, was involved in cartel activities with
other manufacturers of hard disk drives to increase the prices of hard disk drives as a
whole in India. However, the CCI in this case also found that the existence of the alleged
cartel was not sufficiently proven by the complainant after scrutiny of the complainant's
documentation.
While it is too soon to make a judgment on whether the CCI will ensure the fair en-
forcement of the competition legislation of India and apply sanctions provided under the
Competition Act, the just mentioned cases give rise to some optimism.
220. Those cases on unfair practices referred to in clause (x) of sub-section(1) of 36A of the MRTP Act
which will be transferred to the CAT.
221. The 2002 Competition Act, § 66(4).
222. All India Distillers' Ass'n, New Delhi v. Haldyn Glass Gujarat Ltd. Baroda & Ors., UTPE Case No.
30(146)/ 2008, (Competition Comm'n of India 2010).
223. The MRTPC is a quasi-judicial organ which is tasked to prevent unfair trade practice from happening
and works closely with the Central Government of India. Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commision
(MRTPC), MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/
mrtpc.htnl (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
224. Id. at 4.
225. Suresh Goel v. Seagate Singapore International Headquarter Pvt. Ltd., File No. C- 35/2008/DGIR
(Competition Comm'n of India 2010).
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D. CONCLUSION
The benefits of bilateral agreements regarding international cartels are clear-only a
synchronized and international approach will help the developing nations in protecting
their markets from unfair competition practices. This article has shown the state of anti-
cartel policies and legislation in selected jurisdictions, the present state of the coordination
of competition policies through cooperation at the bi-national and international level, and
highlighted some examples of more publicized anti-competition cases. One observation is
that more could be done by the developing NIC nations to increase the collaborative ties
of their anti-competition policies and organs as well as ensure that they fall under the
wider umbrella of regional competition regimes, such as in the case of South Africa and
the European Union. The necessity of safeguarding consumer welfare through effective
domestic anti-competition frameworks was highlighted in the discussed cartel cases. Time
will tell whether the emerging economies will be able to balance competition policy and
consumer welfare in an effective and progressive way without affecting their trade and
investment policies.
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